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ADR AND THE COURTS: RENEWING OUR
COMMITMENT TO INNOVATION
*

DR. JULIE MACFARLANE
I. INTRODUCTION

As the papers from this Symposium demonstrate, considerable
progress has been made over the past decade toward the goal of a
1
“multi-door courthouse” that reflects an expanding legal pluralism.
The traditional assumption of “one size fits all”—where that size was
adjudication by third parties in a public space—has withered in the face
of the growing diversity of conflict resolution practice, both private and
public. Many courthouses now offer mediation programs, neutral
evaluation and assessment services, counseling, duty counsel services,
case management, and judicial settlement conferencing programs. The
importance of attempting to resolve disputes short of a full trial is fully
accepted among policymakers, for whom it makes obvious economic
sense, and is increasingly accepted by members of the bench and bar,
who must continue to protect the rights and interests of disputing
parties. This plethora of processes—with new programs being added all
the time—often feels messy and confusing. We sometimes crave the
certainty and simplicity of the days before the expansion of ADR in the
courts where there was just one process: litigation. Practically speaking,
it is also easier to marshal support behind one or two demonstrably
effective core programs than to keep testing and evaluating new pilot
schemes. However, I shall argue here that we have no choice but to
keep innovating if we are to meet the new challenges of change, despite
how untidy and unsettled that sometimes feels.
* Professor of Law, University of Windsor; Professor of the Practice, Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.
1. A term attributed to Professor Frank Sander, at the Pound Conference (the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice). See
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 113 (1976) (“What are the
significant characteristics of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as
adjudication by courts, arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and various blends of these and
other devises)?”). The term “multi-door courthouse” came to be associated with Professor
Sander’s ideas. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument
that the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97, 97 n.4.
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II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IS AN ART, NOT A SCIENCE
This expansion in programming has led to an increased urgency
2
about “fitting the forum to the fuss” —matching processes to disputes—
and has raised expectations about the efficacy of alternative dispute
resolution. Surely the range of available procedures allows us to
maximize the chances of settlement by selecting the “right” process for a
particular dispute. Doesn’t our deepening experience with settlement
procedures enable us to triage files as they come into the court registry
3
and direct them to the “right” program? If almost all cases settle, can
we use case management tracking to identify the characteristics of the
exceptions early on and fast-track everything else? From a growing
volume of significant evaluation studies, can we distinguish cases based
on particular variables such as area of conflict, party type or numbers, or
amounts at stake, and direct them to the most efficacious processes?
These are tempting thoughts, and we shall continue to debate their
possibilities. For now, however, we must accept their limits. Conflict
resolution is an art and not a science. Disappointingly, evaluation
studies fail to consistently identify particular case characteristics that
4
make those disputes more or less susceptible to resolution via ADR.
Instead, we are reminded of what those of us who practice conflict
resolution are forced to confront each time we convene parties for
negotiation—that every conflict is unique and can rarely be understood
via a checklist of variables, and that our predictive powers are seriously
limited. In fact, one of the most significant variables in settlement is the
5
amount of time spent on a case.
Another crucial factor is the
6
experience of the third party. These factors are not necessarily under

2. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A UserFriendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 66 (1994).
3. See Peter Salem, Debra Kulak & Robin M. Deutsch, Triaging Family Court Services:
The Connecticut Judicial Branch’s Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741, 743, 755–
56 (2007) (discussing the use of triage as an existing “intake and screening practice”).
4. See Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in
Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 80–82 (2004).
5. This is the conclusion of many studies; see, for example, the comprehensive metaanalysis of evaluations of family programs in Joan Hunt & Ceridwen Roberts, Intervening in
Litigated Contact: Ideas from Other Jurisdictions, FAM. POL’Y BRIEFING (Univ. of Oxford:
Dep’t of Soc. Policy & Soc. Work, Oxford, Eng.), Sept. 2008, at 1, 4 (noting a correlation
between mediation attendance and higher settlement rates).
6. Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True: Comparing
Negotiation and Mediation Through Research, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 140–41 (2002).
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our control in our courthouses, where we must live with the
programming and the personnel we have, even while lobbying for more
and better of each.
The uncertainty that characterizes our ability to fit disputes to
processes produces a variety of responses. One is a new assertion of
“one size fits all,” with extravagant claims made for a particular new
procedure. This is exemplified in the zealous promotion of particular
approaches—for example, the now-notorious collaborative law versus
7
cooperative law debate or the debate over facilitative versus evaluative
8
mediation. These discussions may be stimulating on an intellectual
level, but they are often polarizing among practitioners and create
inflated expectations among clients. When the zealous advocates of
particular approaches or processes really get going, they veer
dangerously close to suggesting that one single, preferred process works
“best” for all or even most disputes. This was the flawed thinking that
got us into this current mess in the first place.
The reality of practical conflict resolution requires responsiveness to
the unique nature of each and every conflict. We continue to learn—
about process design, about disputing, about conflict dynamics, about
effective advocacy, and about intervention. This means we must reject
any assumption of orthodoxy—for example, always do facilitative
mediation, always do evaluation mediation, always use lawyermediators, never use lawyer-mediators—or simple formulations for
triage. For all these reasons, it is critical that we continue to experiment
and to innovate in conflict resolution programming and, as we do so,
keep assessing and evaluating.
III. A LANDSCAPE OF CONSTANT CHANGE
A brief review of the pace of change in disputing both inside and
outside the formal court structure reveals a state of flux. ADR in the
courts is constantly evolving and developing—sometimes moving
forward with new programs, sometimes seeing programs defunded, but
always changing. Moreover, each court services manager brings a
nuanced approach to programming in his courthouse, while each state

7. For a perspective on this debate, see John Lande, Practical Insights from an Empirical
Study of Cooperative Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 203, 247–66.
8. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 31–32 (1996).
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policymaker sees different problems and potential in his court system.
Ten years ago, judicial settlement and mediation programs were almost
9
unheard of, but now they are features in many courthouses. Parentingcoordination programming and innovation maintenance enforcement
10
programs proliferate.
As the volume of self-represented litigants
11
(SRLs) in the family and civil courts rises and demands increase for a
more simplified and streamlined civil procedure, we shall see yet more
changes.
Changes in court procedures are a reflection of broader change in
the disputing landscape. The World Wide Web has empowered
consumers like never before through their access to information that
was previously only available to them via professionals.
The
relationship between technical expertise and professional service has
changed beyond recognition by the development of the Internet. Where
lawyers and courts have for generations assumed respect and deference,
clients can now seek out a range of opinions beyond traditional legal
sources. This means that client expectations about “value-for-money”
in professional services, including but not limited to law, are also
changing. When a problem can be Googled and some sort of “expert”
information can be obtained with a few clicks of a mouse, professional
advisors need to be able to offer more than “just” technical information
to represent value-for-money. Some of the tangible results of this shift
are the movement toward web-based self-help legal services; the
increasing role of paralegal services in some areas; new consumer
interest in “unbundling legal services” where they purchase a particular
service from a lawyer rather than retain the lawyer for the duration of a
12
case; and a developing market for all types of vaunted “cost-effective”
dispute resolution processes, including collaborative law and mediation.

9. See generally Roselle L. Wissler, Judicial Settlement Conferences and Staff Mediation:
Empirical Research Findings, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2011, at 18, 18–20 (describing the
now-common use of judicial settlement and mediation programs).
10. Blaisure and Geasler found that the number of U.S. programs increased nearly six
times between 1990 and 1994. Karen R. Blaisure & Margie J. Geasler, Results of a Survey of
Court-Connected Parent Education Programs in U.S. Counties, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 23, 32–33 (1996).
11. See infra Part V.B.
12. See Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM.
L.Q. 421, 422–24 (1994) (defining unbundling legal services as the ability of the client to take
“charge of selecting from lawyers’ services [that are] only a portion of the full package and
contracting with the lawyer accordingly”).
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Because the disputing culture, court and policy initiatives, and the
practice of law keep changing, we have to keep changing too. This is not
a time for the entrenchment of fixed beliefs or academic arguments over
who is a “real” mediator (or conflict resolution practitioner) problemsolver. Instead, we have to welcome well-thought-out innovations with
an open mind.
IV. CONVERGENCE: A SYMPTOM OF CHANGE
One example of the constantly evolving nature of dispute processing
is the development of hybrid models of dispute resolution in legal
practice, judicial processes, and courthouse culture. In each of these
areas, there is evidence of what I have described elsewhere as
13
“convergence,” where two different structural and cultural systems
have moved closer together to produce a new form that borrows
characteristics of each. The result is akin to a chemical reaction, where
two different agents combine to produce a new compound.
Changes in the core skills of legal practice suggest a convergence
between traditional skills and practices and those skills demanded by the
new environment of settlement processes. When lawyers attend
mediation, settlement conferences, and in their dealings with opposing
counsel (evidence shows that it is increasingly normative for this to
14
occur earlier in the life of a file than hitherto), they are practicing what
15
Sometimes
I have described as “conflict resolution advocacy.”
somewhat primitive, unschooled, and simply intuitive conflict resolution
advocacy recognizes that advocacy in a settlement process requires a
different set of skills than “conviction” advocacy—i.e., advocacy to
16
convince a decision-maker. Conflict resolution advocacy is an example
of a hybrid form. It is built on traditional advocacy tools, including the

13. See JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: HOW SETTLEMENT IS
TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF LAW 20 (2008).
14. Earlier opening of negotiation was first institutionalized in some states and provinces
with early mandatory mediation, but there is evidence that it has become part of the legal
culture in some of these centers. See Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities
and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 247. In a 2009 private
study on file with the author, 45% of files that used negotiation first opened discussions either
after the receiving of a statement of claim or after pleadings were closed. Interviews with
counsel suggested a significant shift in the time at which they were willing to open
negotiations.
15. See MACFARLANE, supra note 13, at 117–20.
16. Id. at 49.
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use of fact- and law-based argumentation, thorough research, and
rational logic. But effective conflict resolution advocacy also requires a
consciousness of the other side and its emotional reaction to any
settlement proposal, the need to develop a bargaining relationship, and
a need for clear and effective communication (it is important for the
other side to want to listen to you because they can simply, if they
17
choose, get up and walk away).
Another example of the emergence of a hybrid skill relates to the
fact that lawyers are sometimes obliged to bring their clients to and
enable them to participate in a settlement discussion with a judge or a
mediator. In some instances, client participation may be minimal:
lawyers still like to talk about “gagging” the client and doing the talking
18
themselves. Nevertheless, the presence of clients changes everything.
Repeat clients become more proactive in asserting their role in the
proceedings. Lawyers are being forced to accommodate a new type of
client partnership that requires them to know more, and different, things
about their clients before they walk them into bargaining sessions. For
example, lawyers should know their clients’ emotional priorities, their
psychological barriers to settlement, and perhaps any potential nonlegal remedies to their problem. The evolving practice is a convergence
between the traditionally dominant role of the lawyer, who has
historically conducted negotiation at arm’s length from the client, and a
19
client-only process that dispenses with lawyers altogether.
We are
watching lawyers and their clients struggling to find the balance in
power, airtime, and decision-making in settlement processes.
Another hybrid is emerging in judicial practice through judicial
settlement processes, variously framed as judicial mediation, settlement
20
conferencing, and case management. Each of these and other similar
procedures requires judges to rebrand themselves as the facilitators of
settlements rather than as the adjudicators. This may occur by creating
momentum within a closely managed process, exploring possible deals
in judicial mediation, or simply by speaking frankly to counsel in the
presence of their clients. In taking on this process management role,
17. See id. at 111–16.
18. See id. at 144–50.
19. See id. at 129–30 (describing the “traditional model,” in which “clients are expected
to defer to their lawyer’s expertise,” and contrasting it with changes that are occurring in the
twenty-first century as a result of greater access to legal resources for litigants).
20. See id. at 232–36.
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judges are altering both their relationship to the dispute—which they
previously only understood from the perspective of decision-maker—
21
and the core skills they use. However, they continue to draw on their
traditional authority in all their interventions. The bench is crafting the
role of the “new judge” possibly faster than lawyers are creating the
“new lawyer.”
Finally, we are seeing examples of hybrid processes and procedures
in courthouse culture as a result of the convergence of traditional
22
adjudication and alternative dispute resolution processes.
One
example is the expanding role of non-lawyer professionals in courthouse
programs, such as social workers, mediators, and child-welfare
specialists working alongside lawyers and judges. Another symptom of
change is the growing volume of SRLs, whose needs are beginning to
drive calls for the simplification of court forms and procedures. The
courthouse itself is now a microcosm of the change and the convergence
between the old and new in litigation practice in particular and disputing
in general. In this environment, and in relation to legal and judicial
practice, we must keep innovating and remain open to new thinking and
ideas.
V. STAYING COMMITTED TO INNOVATION: TWO CASE STUDIES
My two most recent research projects provide two informative and
different illustrations of my argument about the need to keep
innovating.
A. Islamic Marriage and Divorce
North American Muslims, both religious and secular, widely practice
23
traditional Islamic procedures for marriage and divorce.
These
procedures are informal private-ordering processes without the force of
21. See id. at 235 (asserting that various new judicial initiatives are “changing the
relationship between the judiciary and disputing systems and, consequently, the way that
judges imagine their role and the skills they require”).
22. See id. at 7 (“All courts function differently than they did twenty years ago, with at
least some shift toward the judicial management of cases and their settlement.”).
23. See JULIE MACFARLANE, INST. FOR SOC. POLICY & UNDERSTANDING,
UNDERSTANDING TRENDS IN AMERICAN MUSLIM DIVORCE AND MARRIAGE: A
DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 6 (2012), available at
http://www.ispu.org/GetReports/35/2399/Publications.aspx
(noting
that
“the
most
commonplace expression of [North American Muslims’] shariʿa obligations is through critical
rites of passage and family transitions, especially marriage and divorce”).
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law, but they represent an important cultural ritual for many Muslims
across social and educational demographics and inside all Muslim
communities irrespective their country of origin. Public speculation
24
over “shariʿa law” has created fear about these processes, and their
real meaning is often obscured by media distortion and by
overwhelming suspicion of Muslims. Muslim marriage (using an Islamic
25
marriage contract or nikah) and divorce approved by an imam are
examples of traditional rituals—in the language of dispute theory,
26
private-ordering processes —that are important to many Muslim
families in North America in the same way that any community tends to
turn to its customs in times of transition and crisis. Muslim marriage
and divorce are not used as substitutes for civil marriage and divorce,
but rather as additional personal and family steps aimed at satisfying the
wider community that the spouses have fulfilled their Islamic
27
obligations, as these are understood in different Muslim cultures.
As an example of cultural and religious norms that play out in the
shadow of the legal system, the case of Islamic marriage and divorce
offers a challenge for the courts. The justice system must decide how to
respond to these traditions. My research showed that North American
Muslims do not expect the courts to apply or enforce Islamic family
law—regarding this as a private area for their personal conscience—but
that they want the courts to have some knowledge of their culture and
the fundamentals of Islamic family law when they rule on conflicts over
28
marriage and divorce between Muslim men and women. For example,
what should the court do when faced with a dispute over the

24. Shariʿa is the interpretation of the Qurʾan (and other sources), which gives rise to
guidelines for good Muslim living. Shariʿa (which is diverse in its understanding among
Muslims) covers formal religious observance, but also many other aspects of family and
everyday life. Id. Islamic law, or fiqh, is a sub-set of shariʿa, and includes only those parts of
shariʿa feasible to raise to the level of a “rule.” The vast majority of Islamic law in the
modern world is concerned with family law—marriage, divorce, and inheritance. On the
distinction between shariʿa and fiqh, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
OF ISLAMIC LAW (2004).
25. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 11.
26. See Julie Macfarlane, Working Towards Restorative Justice in Ethiopia: Integrating
Traditional Conflict Resolution Systems with the Formal Legal System, 8 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 487, 490–91 (2007).
27. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 6. See generally JULIE MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC
DIVORCE IN NORTH AMERICA: A SHARIʿA PATH IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (2012)
[hereinafter MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE].
28. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 13–26.
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enforcement of a required term in a Muslim marriage contract, such as
29
the payment of the mahr, a promise by the husband to give his wife
something of value (anything from a love poem to a large lump-sum
payment) in the event of his death or if they divorce?
In adjudicating such conflicts, judges have a variety of possible
alternatives. The least innovative—and the most pervasive, at least in
the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada—is for the courts to
simply ignore the existence of these extrajudicial processes and the
30
agreements that they lead to. Or should the courts be prepared to
respond to such agreements with sensitivity and respect, taking into
account the expectations they create? Should the courts enforce a
promise in a marriage contract to pay a mahr upon divorce, when the
form of the contract appears to conform to the Statute of Frauds? Or
should the nikah be treated as a non-justiciable “religious contract,”
allowing the husband to escape his obligation from a very public
promise signed in front of hundreds of wedding guests? Should spousal
support simply be substituted? What if this is less than what was
promised in the mahr? What if the woman is committed to receiving
her mahr, but uncomfortable with the idea of spousal support, which
31
does not exist in Islam beyond the period of iddat, usually three
32
months post-divorce?
The practice of religious and cultural traditions raises many
challenges for a secular legal system. Easy answers—assuming that
anything with a whiff of religion is non-justiciable—are increasingly
inadequate. Many North American Muslims are using these traditional
processes as an affirmation of cultural identity—especially in the
33
aftermath of 9/11—rather than as a statement of religious piety. What
could the courts do to innovate here? Some judicial education in
Islamic family law would be an excellent beginning and could have a

29. See id. at 13.
30. In the case of the nikah, the equivalent of a prenuptial agreement, or in the case of
Muslim divorce, an agreement to divorce using Islamic principles, perhaps negotiated with
the help of an imam. See id. at 11 (describing the importance of the nikah in Muslim
marriage).
31. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO WITH NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN IN MUSLIM
FAMILY LAW 20–21 (2d ed. 2001) (defining iddat as a three-month period after divorce,
during which time an Islamic “woman is prohibited from remarrying” if the marriage has
been consummated); MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 36.
32. See EPOSITO WITH DELONG-BAS, supra note 31, at 20–21.
33. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 7.
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direct impact on judicial awards. For example, should an award for
spousal support be offset by any already-paid mahr? Perhaps the court
could appoint a mediator who is familiar with the practices of Islamic
marriage and divorce, who could work with the couple to come to an
agreement that respects their traditions and feels fair to both. Perhaps
the court could sponsor training for imams and others in the Muslim
community who are potential bridge builders between these traditions
34
and the work of the courts (which North American Muslims choose to
35
use extensively to resolve their disputes ).
Ignoring the existence of these traditions and their impact on the
expectations of Muslim men and women coming to family court to
resolve divorce conflicts is not an option if the courthouse is to continue
to meet the needs of a diverse range of individuals in multi-cultural
North America.
B. Self-Represented Litigants
The number of self-represented litigants (SRLs) in North American
courts has increased exponentially over the last ten years. In family
courts, where SRLs have historically been most common, the numbers
are staggering. In 1992, 46% of divorce cases in one California court
36
involved at least one side who was self-represented. By 2000, that
37
percentage had risen to 77%. “In Ontario, unrepresented litigants in
the province’s unified family courts rose almost 500 percent” from 1995
38
to 1999. The numbers are rising too in civil courts, with some districts
39
reporting well over half of litigants representing themselves.
34. See id. at 42.
35. See generally MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE, supra note 27.
36. See Bonnie Rose Hough, Description of California Courts’ Programs for SelfRepresented Litigants, 11 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 305, 306 (2004).
37. See id. The 2004 California Task Force on SRLs reported a continuing rise. See
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 9 (2004).
38. Lynne Cohen, Unrepresentative Justice, CANADIAN LAW., Aug. 2001, at 40, 40.
39. Memorandum from Madelynn Herman, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Re: SelfRepresentation Pro Se Statistics (Sept. 25, 2006), https://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/Memos/ProSeStatsMemo.htm. In the United States, data collected by the
National Center for State Courts reports that 85% of all New Hampshire district court civil
cases have one pro se party, and that 58% for the same existed in Iowa district court. See id.
For information about Canadian efforts to increase access to justice for litigants, see
ADVOCATES’ SOC’Y, STREAMLINING THE ONTARIO CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2006),
available at http://www.advocates.ca/assets/files/pdf/publications/streamlining-justice.pdf.
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Just why SRLs are appearing more and more often in the justice
system and what the system can and should do to accommodate them
are more complex questions than is sometimes recognized. These are
the questions that my new research is seeking to answer by interviewing
40
SRLs in three Canadian provinces. There is a widespread assumption
that litigants choose to represent themselves because they cannot afford
legal representation (exacerbated by declines in civil and family legal
41
aid ). Some of those who might qualify for legal aid find it impossible
to navigate the layers of bureaucracy they must traverse to be declared
eligible for help. However, while lack of access to legal aid is clearly an
overriding factor, a number of SRLs declare that they are representing
themselves either because they can do “as good a job” as a lawyer, or
42
because of a past bad experience with a lawyer. Regardless of the
accuracy of this assertion—and court staff and judges may disagree—
perceptions are key in research that seeks to explain a new
phenomenon. This belief appears to be related to declining public
confidence in lawyers and the justice system, diminishing deference
toward lawyers and judges, and a renewed desire for value-for-money
service in an era of economic hardship. How SRLs understand their
competence and power in relation to professional advice and assistance
has been dramatically altered by access to the World Wide Web and
43
online legal information.
What does the SRL phenomenon mean for innovation in the courts?
Much of the research conducted in Canada and the United States to
date has adopted a traditional paradigm of “unmet legal needs” (that is,
assuming that the needs of SRLs are exclusively “legal,” variously

40. See the project website at http://www.representing-yourself.com/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=53 (last visited May 14, 2012).
41. For example, the Ontario Legal Aid Review reported that “in 1996/97 the Plan issued
only 14,063 family law certificates. . . . The contrast with previous years [wa]s striking. In the
fiscal year 1993/94, 65,691 family law certificates were issued in the province. The number of
family certificates has dropped to levels not seen since 1970.” See ONTARIO LEGAL AID
REVIEW, REPORT OF THE ONTARIO LEGAL AID REVIEW: A BLUEPRINT FOR PUBLICLY
FUNDED SERVICES 169 (1997).
42. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COURT SERVS., HALIFAX, N.S., SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS IN NOVA SCOTIA: NEEDS ASSESSMENT STUDY 27 (2004), available
at http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/publications/docs/SRL%20Report%20March%202004.pdf
(reporting survey results where 21.5% of respondents indicated that they could “do as good a
job for myself” and 16% indicated “previous bad experience with lawyers”).
43. See MACFARLANE, supra note 13, at 62–63, 129–44.

14 - MACFARLANE-10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

938

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/8/2012 10:07 PM

[95:927
44

defined) and has focused on providing legal information and advice.
The overall goal appears to be to accommodate or assimilate SRLs into
45
the existing system using, for example, duty counsel and online
46
Many innovative programs have already
information systems.
commenced in these areas with courts setting up web-based and
47
courthouse-based stations for assisting SRLs. Another response is to
simplify court forms and procedures, and steps are being taken across
North America to make the courts more accessible and less intimidating
to the huge number of SRLs that are coming forward with their cases.
Both of these developments have also taken some fire, with the volume
and density of information and forms continuing to frustrate even the
48
most determined and literate SRL.
Innovation for SRLs may need to go much further if this growing
and increasingly vocal population is to be better satisfied and less
frustrated with what the courts offer them. Part of the challenge with
remaining open to innovation is remaining open to reframing the
research questions we are asking. A more creative way of thinking
about this challenge is to ask: What would the justice system look like if
it were adjusted to the needs of SRLs, instead of the other way around?
To answer this question, we have to overcome our assumptions about
what SRLs are really looking for in the justice system—just legal
remedies—and examine the importance of a sense of fair process
(procedural justice), an opportunity to express their grievances,
vindication, acknowledgement, relationship repair, and practical
problem-solving. What ADR processes could meet some of these needs
and how could they be customized to accommodate those without legal
representation? Are new responsibilities for judges a crucial part of this
type of innovation? In process design, how can there be fairness where
one side has counsel and the other does not? And what are the
responsibilities of counsel—should they offer unbundled legal services,
49
which so many SRLs say they want but cannot find? Will this presage

44. See INNOVATIONS FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (Bonnie Rose Hough &
Pamela Cardullo Ortiz eds., 2011).
45. Duty counsel refers to counsel available for free legal advice at the courthouse.
46. Id.
47. See the models described in INNOVATIONS FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS,
supra note 44.
48. Interviews with SRLs on file with the author.
49. Id.
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another form of legal-practice hybrid?
VI. THE ESSENCE OF EFFECTIVE INNOVATION
I have argued here that continuing commitment to innovation in
court-based ADR is a necessity if court programming is to meet the
needs of twenty-first century disputants. It is a relatively easy argument
to make. The real challenge of innovation is not its justification but its
practice. The heart of real and effective innovation is changing or
modifying values, requiring us to look closely and deeply at our core
beliefs and assumptions about disputing; often, it requires tearing them
up and rethinking them in the face of yet another unique challenge or
conflict. Innovation is not just marketing—promoting oneself as a
“collaborative lawyer” or a “new lawyer” or an “accredited mediator.”
Neither is it only tactical change—“making nice” in mediation or telling
the client to stay quiet in a settlement conference. Innovation requires
an authentic commitment to trying something new and retaining an
open mind to the result. This does not mean that we should be rash or
forget to use our judgment and experience—but that dispute resolution
innovation deserves our full intellectual and affective energy if it is to be
a “real” experiment in something new.
We are often eager to draft rules to define and constrain innovations
and to try to fit a new process or procedure back into one of our more
familiar schema. Witness the energy expended on debates over
professional ethical regulations in relation to conflict-resolution
50
innovations, such as collaborative law. Sometimes the energy we put
into developing new rules seems to be a substitute for the energy needed
for trying something new. To be effective innovators, we need to limit
our preoccupation with rule-based change and explore other ways to
support and build culture change. When we experiment with new
processes, we should resist easy orthodoxies and stay open to the
possibility of failure. As we try out new process-designs, or modify
existing procedures in small but important ways, we should carefully
reflect on the course of our experiment—its benefits, its downsides, its
special challenges. If we can do this and resist the polarities and

50. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 73, 84–116 (2005); John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative
Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of
Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1330–31 & n.48 (2003).
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simplistic classifications that reflect our desire for certainty, we can stay
committed to innovation and the courts will continue to be the focus of
our hopes for a responsive, relevant, and fair justice system.

